Justification of intergroup violence – the role of right-wing authoritarianism and propensity for radical action by Faragó, Laura et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rdac20
Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict
Pathways toward terrorism and genocide
ISSN: 1746-7586 (Print) 1746-7594 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rdac20
Justification of intergroup violence – the role of
right-wing authoritarianism and propensity for
radical action
Laura Faragó, Anna Kende & Péter Krekó
To cite this article: Laura Faragó, Anna Kende & Péter Krekó (2019) Justification of intergroup
violence – the role of right-wing authoritarianism and propensity for radical action, Dynamics of
Asymmetric Conflict, 12:2, 113-128, DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2019.1576916
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2019.1576916
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 22 Feb 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 697
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Justiﬁcation of intergroup violence – the role of right-wing
authoritarianism and propensity for radical action
Laura Faragó a,b, Anna Kende b and Péter Krekób,c
aDoctoral School of Psychology, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary; bInstitute of
Psychology, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary; cPolitical Capital Institute, Budapest,
Hungary
ABSTRACT
Economic and political trends of the last decades resulted in a
general rise in anti-minority populism in Hungary. Anti-minority
sentiments have been manifested in violence primarily against the
Roma, but also against other target groups. The aim of the current
study is to reveal the social psychological mechanisms of justifying
intergroup violence against outgroups representing a symbolic or
a physical threat. Considering that right-wing authoritarianism
(RWA) can legitimize violence agsainst threatening outgroups,
we hypothesized that RWA would be more important in explain-
ing justiﬁcation of intergroup violence than a general propensity
for radical action. We tested our hypothesis using computer-
assisted personal interviews using a representative sample of
1000 respondents. Using structural equation modelling, we
found that RWA was a much stronger predictor of the justiﬁcation
of intergroup violence against both physically and symbolically
threatening groups than propensity for radical action.
Furthermore, a comparison of the groups also revealed that
those who justify violence against symbolically threatening groups
were also higher in right-wing authoritarianism. These ﬁndings
highlight that RWA justiﬁes politically motivated aggression
against diﬀerent target groups in Hungary.
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Violent street rioting in 2006, a serial murder case and physical oﬀences against the
Roma by far-right paramilitary groups, and attacks against gay and lesbian people
during several pride marches are just some examples to indicate that politically moti-
vated intergroup violence is an existing problem in Hungary. Since the beginning of the
refugee crisis in 2015, violent language in politics has been on the rise (Goździak &
Márton, 2018). We investigated which groups have a higher chance of becoming victims
of violence and what the social psychological mechanisms are that justify intergroup
violence. Speciﬁcally, we were interested in the role of ideology and right-wing author-
itarianism in triggering political violence against diﬀerent target groups.
Violence – for example in the context of protests – can be an expression of strong
political discontent (Muller & Jukam, 1983), grievance (Lemieux & Asal, 2010), or the
outcome of intergroup situations that are perceived stable and illegitimate (Livingstone,
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Spears, Manstead, & Bruder, 2009; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006).
Discontent can be explained by group-based – so-called “fraternal” – relative deprivation
(Runciman, 1966), when people feel that their group is at a disadvantaged compared to
other groups or their situation improves less than that of other groups, resulting in
feelings of injustice and resentment. Deprivation is a subjective psychological state, and
it is independent from objective socio-economic status (King & Taylor, 2011). Relative
deprivation and discontent can be the hotbeds of violent political action (Daskin, 2016)
like radical protest, which seems to be an acceptable method to abolish the injustices.
In addition to perceived injustices, frustration of basic human needs, such as the need
for security, positive identity, and feeling of eﬀectiveness, can also lead to the loss of
well-being – as a result of diﬃcult social conditions, economic problems, and political
conﬂicts (Staub, 1999). The combination of diﬃcult, frustrating societal conditions and
intergroup conﬂicts enhance the probability of violence (Staub, 2000). Groups that are
perceived responsible for the injustices can become the targets of violence (Daskin,
2016). Scapegoating, the process of putting the blame on an outgroup for the frustrat-
ing conditions, cannot only target the groups “below” – disadvantaged, less-powerful
and incompetent groups – but also the groups “above” – competent groups that are
perceived to be more dangerous (Glick, 2002).
Most forms of violence are perceived as morally unacceptable – therefore, political
violence usually needs ideological justiﬁcation (Daskin, 2016). Ideologically fuelled
stereotypes depict outgroups as malicious, harmful, and inﬂuential and can legitimize
aggression against them (Glick, 2002; Staub, 2000). Therefore, violence against these
outgroups can potentially be perceived as necessary self-defence, and normative to the
ingroup (Glick, 2002). Furthermore, if people are alienated from the political system
(Muller & Jukam, 1983), if they have insuﬃcient political power, and if they think that
political aggression is acceptable in order to reach important goals, they may choose
participation in aggressive political protests as a form of expressing their opinion
(Tausch et al., 2011). Terrorism can be seen as a moral act, a form of heroism for the
supporters of the terrorist groups (Horgan, 2005). Therefore, the ideologies of the
ingroup can legitimize or even reward violence.
The importance of right-wing authoritarianism in explaining intergroup violence
When it comes to the ideological or attitudinal aﬃnity to embrace ideologies that justify
political violence, individual diﬀerences also matter. Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA;
Altemeyer, 1981) is one of the important factors when it comes to the justiﬁcation of
political violence. RWA comprises three surface traits: authoritarian submission, conven-
tionalism, and authoritarian aggression. Authoritarians believe that the world is a
threatening and dangerous place, as RWA is based on the motivations of social control
and security (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005a; Duckitt, 2001, 2006).
Authoritarians are motivated to preserve ingroup norms (Duriez & van Hiel, 2002;
Lippa & Arad, 1999), so they value social conformity rather than individual autonomy
(Cohrs et al., 2005aa; Duckitt, 2001).
Right-wing authoritarianism is directly associated with the ideological justiﬁcation of
political violence. Previous research suggests that RWA predicts antidemocratic and
militaristic attitudes (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielman, 2005b), such as attitudes
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towards war, corporal punishment, and penal code violence (Benjamin, 2006), and the
restriction of civil liberties (Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005). RWA also pre-
dicted abusive and torture-like behaviour (Dambrun & Vatiné, 2010; Larsson, Björklund,
& Bäckström, 2012). Authoritarian aggression and prejudice are due to submission to
authorities and their norms, and the uncritical acceptance of the leader’s statements that
devalue the norm-breaker groups (Lippa & Arad, 1999).
RWA is also associated with negative intergroup attitudes (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt &
Sibley, 2007) related to the motivational goals of security, cohesion, group, and societal
order, and the perceived threat that culturally diﬀerent outgroups represent to this
order (Hadarics & Kende, 2018b). When outgroups are perceived as threatening, people
with high RWA are more likely to turn to aggression to defend their group. Willingness
to kill, torture, and hunt down immigrants is connected to a perception of immigrants as
violating ingroup norms (Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008). People high on RWA may
feel morally superior to norm breakers, which leads to hostile attitudes and violence
towards them (Altemeyer, 2006).
Groups as targets of violence
According to the Dual-Process Model (DPM), RWA-based prejudice is directed either
towards groups that are physically dangerous, or towards groups that threaten the
existing conventions and stability of society (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). The
DPM named the ﬁrst type of groups “Dangerous groups”. These groups can harm
directly, and cause threat to security. Terrorists, violent criminals, drug dealers, drug
users, Satanists, and others who are perceived as dangerous to our physical security and
as able to disrupt safety belong to this cluster. “Dissident groups”, on the other hand,
reject and violate the norms accepted by the authoritarian person, and therefore
represent a symbolic, and not a physical threat. According to the original study,
prostitutes, atheists, feminists, protestors, and groups criticizing authority belong to
this category of outgroups, as they are perceived to cause disagreement and disunity
(Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). While cultural variations in the perception of
groups exist, dangerous and dissident groups could be distinguished in Hungary as well
(Hadarics & Kende, 2018a). The distinction between dangerous and dissident groups is
similar to the distinction between realistic and symbolic threat in the framework of
integrated threat theory (Stephan, Stephan, & Gudykunst, 1999). Realistic threat involves
threats to the existence and physical welfare of the ingroup, while symbolic threat can
be deﬁned as a threat to the worldview of the ingroup: the moral rightness of values,
beliefs, and attitudes.
Although RWA predicts prejudice against both physically dangerous and symbolically
threatening groups (Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010), violence against physically dan-
gerous groups can be justiﬁed as self-defence, and therefore aggression is more accep-
table against these groups than against other types of outgroups. However, violence
against symbolically threatening groups needs further justiﬁcation than self-defence, as
the harm they represent to the ingroup is less tangible. In a study about diﬀerent
intergroup contexts in Hungary, negative stereotypes about diﬀerent outgroups’
norm-violating misbehaviour served as a justiﬁcation for their moral exclusion for
those high in RWA (Hadarics & Kende, 2018b). Threat to social cohesion, stability, and
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order are common reasons against norm-breaker groups (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007), and
authoritarians are highly sensitive to these threats. As RWA ensures the ideological,
value-based legitimation that helps to let aggression be seen as justiﬁed (Gerber &
Jackson, 2017), we can expect that RWA has a more important role in explaining the
justiﬁcation of violence against symbolically threatening groups than propensity for
radical protest, which lacks such ideological component.
We aimed to reveal whether the use of violence is justiﬁed diﬀerently against
physically dangerous and symbolically threatening outgroups, and to reveal the social
psychological mechanisms of justifying intergroup violence.
The context of the current study: Hungary
Changes in the political and economic system and the collapse of state socialism in 1989
in Hungary has severely transformed social relations. The high unemployment rate in the
ﬁrst decade after the transition, and a lack of security and trust among citizens (Bunce &
Csanádi, 1993), intolerance for inequality and the demand for redistribution (Tóth, 2008),
and alienation from the political institutions (Kovács, 2013) were among the conse-
quences of the transformation from state socialism to liberal democracy in the region. As
the state’s oppressive power and its “monopoly” in deﬁning the nation’s enemies
declined and gave way to free speech, animosity and hostile speech ﬂourished, as
people were free to express their hostility towards social, ethnic, and religious minorities.
As a result, there was a rise in the verbal and physical attacks against these groups, as
some kind of “democratization of animosity” (Bustikova, 2015).
The economic crisis in 2008 further increased the level of general discontent and
helped the rise of the extreme right (Kovács, 2013) radical, populist, and ultranationalist
right-wing ideologies (Krekó & Juhász, 2018) and hostility towards minorities (Vidra &
Fox, 2014). Anti-elitist and penal populist ideologies dominate public discourse. For
instance, discourse about “Gypsy-crime” was initiated, proposing a collective criminaliza-
tion of Roma people, an increase in sentencing and public spending on police (Boda,
Szabó, Bartha, Medve-Bálint, & Vidra, 2015). On the local level, some political players
could exploit the “scapegoat-based policy-making”, in which the ethnic minorities are
becoming victims of systemic ethnic discrimination (Kovarek, Róna, Hunyadi, & Krekó,
2017). The punitive attitudes of the general population are the highest in Hungary
compared to other European countries (Boda et al., 2015). In sum, dominant social
norms create an environment in which violence can be seen as justiﬁed and necessary;
therefore, it is especially essential to reveal the social psychological mechanisms of
justifying intergroup violence in this context.
The current research
As we have seen, dissatisfaction and alienation from the political system can increase
participation in radical protest (Muller & Jukam, 1983), and groups perceived to be
responsible for the ingroup’s ill fate and frustration can become targets of this violence
(Glick, 2002; Staub, 1999, 2000). However, the justiﬁcation of intergroup violence can
also be connected to the speciﬁc social and ideological attitude cluster of right-wing
authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981). The purpose of the study is to identify the social
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psychological explanations of accepting and legitimizing intergroup violence.
Understanding how people justify aggression against diﬀerent groups is crucial for
tackling violent behaviour and attitudes.
We investigated whether aggression can be justiﬁed against symbolically threatening
and physically dangerous groups in the contemporary Hungarian context. Although we
assumed that both propensity for radical protest and right-wing authoritarianism would
explain the justiﬁcation of intergroup violence, we hypothesized that RWA would predict
it more strongly than general propensity for radical protest (Hypothesis 1), as RWA gives
ideological reasons to legitimize aggression against threatening outgroups. We also
presumed that those who justify violence against symbolically threatening groups
would be higher in right-wing authoritarianism (Hypothesis 2), because RWA gives an
ideological basis for the justiﬁcation of violence as a tool also against symbolically
threatening groups.
Method
Data collection and participants
We relied on a data set of a nationally representative survey conducted by Ipsos, a
public opinion research company. The questionnaire was put together by the Political
Capital Policy Research and Consulting Institute that provided us with the data set for
secondary analysis. The data and materials that support the ﬁndings of this study are
available upon individual request from Political Capital Policy Research and Consulting
Institute.
Pollsters of Ipsos contacted those respondents who agreed to participate and ﬁt into
the quota set which was based on the recent national census (Population Census, 2011).
The non-response rate was not provided by Ipsos. Pollsters questioned respondents
using computer-assisted personal interviews (CAPI), and the interviews took place in the
respondents’ homes. It was an omnibus survey that measured several other constructs
not mentioned in this study. Because the survey was long and served multiple purposes,
we could only use shortened scales to measure the variables for our current study.
One thousand individuals participated in the research. The sample of the omnibus
survey was matched to the recent national census (Population Census, 2011), and was
representative in terms of gender, age, education, and settlement type for the
Hungarian adult population (over the age of 18 years). For instance, 17.4% of the
resident population lives in Budapest, 52.1% in other towns, and 30.5% in villages
according to the national census, and in our sample the proportions were 18.1% for
Budapest, 52.9% for towns, and 29% for villages.
Measures
Propensity for radical protest
We measured whether people intended to participate in illegal strikes and demonstra-
tions or engaged in violent and harmful protests in order to preserve values that were
important for them, by listing diﬀerent situations. If they had never participated in any of
the listed situations, they could indicate their willingness to participate. Although
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willingness and real participation are not the same things, we measured both as
intention is a reliable precursor of behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). We measured
propensity for radical protest with these items. Respondents rated these statements on a
scale of 1–3, where 1 meant “would never do”, 2 stood for “might do” and 3 meant
“have already done”. The items are presented in Table 1.
We analysed the factor structure of these items, assuming that they would constitute
one factor. We conducted an exploratory factor analysis using principal axis factoring.
The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin value was .88, and only one factor emerged with an eigenvalue
of 4.57. This factor explained 57.10% of the total variance. The factor loadings ranged
from .69 to .80. We created a mean-based index instead of factor scores, to ensure that
all situations are included with the same weight. The reliability of this index proved to be
excellent (Cronbach α = .91).
Justiﬁcation of violence against outgroups
Groups were selected to represent heterogeneous categories that often appear in
Hungarian public discourse, such as the Roma, criminals, terrorists, politicians, banks,
Jews, multinational companies, lesbian and gay people, and authoritarian leaders under-
mining democracy. Criminals were chosen to represent tangible deviance. Politicians,
authoritarian leaders undermining democracy, banks, and multinational companies were
included because they are perceived as inﬂuential, powerful, and they possess control
over resources.
Respondents had to evaluate whether the use of violence could be justiﬁed against
these groups. They responded on a Likert scale of 1–5, where 1 = completely unjustiﬁ-
able and 5 = completely justiﬁable. They had to rate the groups separately. We analysed
the factor structure of these groups, and assumed a two-factor solution. We conducted
an exploratory factor analysis using principal axis factoring with promax rotation. The
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin value was .90. Two factors emerged: the ﬁrst factor had an eigen-
value of 5.20, and the second an eigenvalue of 1.24. These two explained 71.53% of the
total variance. Using Kaiser’s criterion, we selected these two factors as their eigenvalue
was larger than 1. The two-factor solution was also supported by conﬁrmatory factor
analysis: this model (χ2(24) = 149.01, p < .000, RMSEA = .074, TLI = .946, CFI = .964,
SRMR = .030) ﬁtted the data much better than a model with one factor, which had
unacceptable model ﬁt (χ2(27) = 701.52, p < .000, RMSEA = .163, TLI = .740, CFI = .805,
SRMR = .101). The correlation between the factors was r = .47, p < .001. The pattern
matrix of the explorative factor analysis with the factor loadings is seen in Table 2.
Table 1. The items of propensity for radical protest scale.
1. Participate in violent action if your livelihood was in danger
2. Defame an immoral politician, even in his presence
3. Join an illegal strike
4. Join an illegal demonstration
5. Fight the police if your livelihood was in danger
6. Participate in a violent act to defend your opinion or values
7. Would you hit or throw something at an immoral politician if she or he was near you?
8. Fight the police to protect your opinion and values
Note. Statements are rated on a scale of 1 to 3, where 1 meant “would never do”, 2 stood for “might do” and 3 meant
“have already done”.
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The ﬁrst factor comprised multinational companies, Jews, banks, politicians, lesbian
and gay people, authoritarian leaders undermining democracy, and Roma people.
Inﬂuential groups and minority groups belonged to this factor. Terrorists and criminals
loaded on the second factor. We created two indices from the two factors that we used
in subsequent analyses. We again computed a mean-based index instead of factor
scores. We named the ﬁrst factor “symbolically threatening groups”, and the second
“physically dangerous groups”. The reliability proved to be excellent for symbolically
threatening groups (Cronbach α = .93), and the correlation between physically danger-
ous groups was high as well (r = .79, p < .001).
Right-wing authoritarianism
We measured right-wing authoritarianism using four items from the RWA scale
(Altemeyer, 1981; translated and adapted by Enyedi, 1996). Respondents rated these
items on a Likert scale of 1 = disagree strongly to 5 = strongly agree. We created a
mean-based index that we used in subsequent analyses. The reliability of this shortened
scale is acceptable (Cronbach α = .74).
Results
Descriptive statistics
Regarding the justiﬁcation of violence against diﬀerent outgroups, the number of valid
responses, the means and standard deviations are seen in Table 3.
Table 2. Pattern matrix of groups with factor loadings.
Factor
1 2
Multinational companies .93
Jews .93
Banks .86
Politicians .84
Lesbian and gay people .77
Authoritarian leaders undermining democracy .67
Roma .65
Terrorists .94
Criminals .86
Table 3. Justiﬁcation of violence against the outgroups. Number of valid responses, means, and
standard deviations of the groups.
Number of responses Mean (on a 1–5 scale) Standard deviation
Terrorists 963 3.91 1.34
Criminals 942 3.67 1.35
Roma 922 2.85 1.34
Authoritarian leaders undermining democracy 914 2.79 1.30
Banks 907 2.61 1.37
Politicians 906 2.60 1.34
Multinational companies 905 2.43 1.29
Jews 895 2.31 1.26
Lesbian and gay people 915 2.23 1.25
Note. Bigger means indicate more justiﬁed violence
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Respondents thought that violence can be justiﬁed mostly against terrorists, and
least against lesbian and gay people. To check whether aggression against one kind
of group was more accepted than against other groups, we conducted a paired-
samples t-test. It showed that respondents accepted more aggression against physi-
cally dangerous groups than against symbolically threatening groups (t
(933) = −29.22, p < .001, d = 1.03).
The Pearson correlations between propensity for radical protest, right-wing author-
itarianism, and the justiﬁcation of violence against symbolically threatening and physi-
cally dangerous groups are presented in Table 4. Propensity for radical protest and RWA
did not correlate with each other signiﬁcantly, indicating that we measured diﬀerent
constructs.
Hypothesis testing using structural equation modelling
To check the connection between right-wing authoritarianism, propensity for radical
protest, and the justiﬁcation of violence against symbolically threatening and physically
dangerous groups, we conducted structural equation modelling (SEM). We used boot-
strapping with 2000 re-samples in AMOS (Arbuckle, 2013). The SEM model is illustrated
in Figure 1.
Interestingly, conﬁrmatory factor analysis revealed that Roma people and author-
itarian leaders undermining democracy loaded on the dangerous factor as well, but
these factor loadings were quite low (Roma people: r = .15, p < .001; authoritarian
leaders undermining democracy: r = .22, p < .001). Nonetheless, allowing these two
groups to load also on the physically dangerous factor enhanced the model ﬁt. We
also allowed three correlated errors in our model (see Figure 1), which were theore-
tically plausible, and improved the model ﬁt. Our model showed acceptable ﬁt: χ2
(180) = 940.41, p < .001, RMSEA = .076, CFI = .922, TLI = .909, NFI = .905. As we
assumed, right-wing authoritarianism was a stronger predictor of justiﬁcation of
violence against symbolically threatening groups (β = .52, p < .001, CI: .45, .60)
than propensity for radical protest (β = .15, p < .001, CI: .07, .22), and the diﬀerence
between the two predictors is highly signiﬁcant, as there was no overlap between
the 95% conﬁdence intervals. Right-wing authoritarianism also signiﬁcantly explained
the justiﬁcation of violence against physically dangerous groups (β = .29, p < .001, CI:
.21, .37), but propensity for radical protest did not predict it signiﬁcantly (β = .06,
p < .136, CI: −.02, .12), in line with our hypothesis.
Table 4. Correlation matrix between main measures.
1 2 3 4
1. Propensity for radical protest 1 M = 1.11 SD = .27
2. RWA .02 1 M = 2.62 SD = .71
3. The justiﬁcation of violence against symbolically threatening
groups
.21** .31** 1 M = 2.56 SD = 1.11
4. The justiﬁcation of violence against physically dangerous groups .11** .13** .43** 1 M = 3.79 SD = 1.27
Note. Statistical signiﬁcance is indicated at the following level: **p < .01.
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Discussion
Hungary is an important place for investigating the justiﬁcation of intergroup violence
owing to the special economic and political situation, which resulted in intolerance for
inequality (Tóth, 2008), alienation from the political institutions (Kovács, 2013), penal
populist attitudes (Boda et al., 2015), and hostility towards minorities (Bustikova, 2015).
These factors are the sources of discontent, resentment, and propensity for intergroup
violence. In Hungary, dominant social norms and public discussions in the political arena
create an environment where violence can be seen as justiﬁed and necessary; therefore,
Right-wing authoritarianism 
Justification of violence 
against symbolically 
threatening groups 
Propensity for radical protest 
Justification of violence 
against physically 
dangerous groups 
.52***
.06
.29***
.15***
.35***
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 
.75*** .70*** .65*** .50***
Politicians
Banks
Jews Multinational 
companies Homosexuals
Roma Leaders
.72***
.88***
.88***
.81***
.83***
.70***
.66***
Item 1 
Item 2 
Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 6
Item 7
Item 8
.75***
.73***
.79*** .82***
.80***
.77***
.69***
.72***
Criminals Terrorists
.98*** .78***
.15*** .22***
.36***
.28***
.35***
Figure 1. The relationship between right-wing authoritarianism, propensity for radical protest, and the
justiﬁcation of violence against symbolically threatening and physically dangerous groups.
Note. Standardized regression coeﬃcients and correlations are displayed with probability values.***p < .001.
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it is crucial to identify the psychological mechanisms of accepting and legitimizing
intergroup violence.
We investigated whether violence can be justiﬁed against symbolically threatening
and physically dangerous groups in the context of contemporary Hungarian society. In
order to demonstrate the distinction between physically dangerous and symbolically
threatening groups, groups were selected that often appear in Hungarian public dis-
course. We presumed that right-wing authoritarianism has a more important role in
explaining the justiﬁcation of intergroup aggression than propensity for radical protest,
and that those who justify violence against symbolically threatening groups are higher
in right-wing authoritarianism. Both of our assumptions were supported. This result is
not surprising as RWA ensures the ideological, value-based legitimation that helps to let
aggression be seen justiﬁed (Gerber & Jackson, 2017), but propensity for radical protest
does not give such ideological legitimation. According to a recent study, negative
stereotypes about diﬀerent outgroups’ norm-violating misbehaviour justiﬁed their
moral exclusion for those high in RWA (Hadarics & Kende, 2018b), which is also parallel
with our ﬁndings. Authoritarians are highly sensitive to threats related to stability, order,
social cohesion, and the physical integrity of the ingroup, which are common reasons
against norm-breaker and dangerous groups (Cohrs et al., 2005aa; Duckitt, 2001, 2006;
Duckitt & Sibley, 2007), but those high in propensity for radical protest are not suscep-
tible to these threats. Interestingly, right-wing authoritarianism was a much stronger
predictor of the justiﬁcation of violence against symbolically threatening groups than
against physically dangerous groups, contrary to empirical research which states that
RWA predicts hostility towards both type of groups equally (Asbrock et al., 2010). One
possible explanation might be that although those high in right-wing authoritarianism
are more susceptible to threats related to the physical integrity of the ingroup, safety is a
basic human need for all (Maslow, 1943), but adherence to norms and tradition is not.
Consequently, the variance of justiﬁcation of violence against physically dangerous
groups explained by right-wing authoritarianism was much smaller, but still strong.
The acceptance of violence towards these groups diﬀered signiﬁcantly: respondents
thought that aggressive behaviour against physically dangerous groups is more justiﬁed
than against symbolically threatening groups. Aggression was the most acceptable
against terrorists and criminals which makes sense as they pose direct threat to indivi-
duals, so the reason for self-defence might be suﬃcient to legitimize violence against
them. Nonetheless, symbolically threatening groups threaten the existing moral norms
and conventions of the society, so their harm is less tangible (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007).
This category included Roma people, Jews, lesbian and gay people, politicians, banks,
multinational companies, and authoritarian leaders undermining democracy. As an
alternative interpretation, these groups can be regarded as “distrusted” because besides
violating the moral norms and conventions of the majority, they might elicit distrust in
the perceiver. Participants may have perceived these groups diﬀerently: for instance, the
term “authoritarian leaders undermining democracy” has two meanings in the highly
polarized Hungarian politics. For supporters of the opposition parties, the authoritarian
leader is Viktor Orbán, who poses a real threat to Hungary’s EU membership by creating
an illiberal democracy. Nonetheless, his supporters perceive the situation in the opposite
direction because of governmental propaganda: in their eyes, the European Union and
George Soros are the enemies. According to Viktor Orbán’s rhetoric, George Soros pulls
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the strings, and he also controls the EU and poses danger to Hungarian democracy via
spreading dangerous liberalism in Hungary (Krekó & Enyedi, 2018). Consequently, this
term has two meanings depending on one’s partisanship (supporting or opposing the
government). According to conﬁrmatory factor analysis and SEM, authoritarian leaders
undermining democracy and Roma people were weakly related to physically dangerous
groups as well. This makes sense because authoritarian leaders undermining democracy
can also pose a threat to the physical integrity of individuals, and criminality often
appears in anti-Roma stereotypes in Hungary (see e.g., Kende, Hadarics, & Lášticová,
2017).
The novelty of our contribution in the literature of right-wing authoritarianism is
that we widened the categories that represent symbolic threat. Previous studies that
aimed to investigate the dual-process model of prejudice used groups that cause
disunity and disagreement in society, such as atheists, feminists, protestors, or
groups criticizing authority, and ethnic or sexual minorities that seem to reject and
violate the norms and values accepted by the authoritarian person (Duckitt, 2006;
Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Hadarics & Kende, 2018a), and RWA predicted prejudice,
hostility, and violence towards them (Altemeyer, 2006; Thomsen et al., 2008). We
also included powerful and inﬂuential groups such as politicians, authoritarian lea-
ders undermining democracy, banks, and multinational companies, all which possess
control over resources, and were not expected to correlate with right-wing author-
itarianism. Nonetheless, these groups loaded on the same factor as other symboli-
cally threatening groups, which means that they all pose threat to the authoritarian
person. Our research shows that RWA also justiﬁes violence against groups that have
high status and seem competent (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007), at least in a post-
socialist country. The system change and the recent economic crisis heightened
people’s intolerance for inequality and their demand for redistribution (Tóth, 2008),
and perhaps made authoritarians distrust and hate these groups for violating these
principles.
Our work has some practical implications. As right-wing authoritarianism justiﬁes
violence against both symbolically threatening and physically dangerous groups, inter-
ventions could target the RWA-based threat to reduce the justiﬁcation of violence. RWA
is better conceptualized as an ideological attitude dimension than a personality trait
(Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010), which implies that right-wing authoritarianism
is a more ﬂexible construct and can be inﬂuenced by threat. For instance, higher levels
of external threat can enhance RWA, but RWA can also increase perceived threat, so the
association is bidirectional (Onraet, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014). Although most studies
focus on how threat increases RWA (see e.g., Asbrock & Fritsche, 2013; Cohrs & Asbrock,
2009; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Onraet et al., 2014), almost no studies exist related to the
decrease in authoritarian attitudes. Political discourse depicting outgroups as a threat
also matter. For instance, Donald Trump’s authoritarian statements about race, sexuality,
gender, and foreign aﬀairs were the most favourable among those high in RWA (Choma
& Hanoch, 2017), indicating that threat-inducing political discourses also play a role in
this process. Consequently, future interventions could target the RWA-based threat to
reduce prejudice. Self-aﬃrmation interventions have been successful in reducing both
prejudice and identity threat (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Zárate & Garza, 2002).
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Limitations, conclusion and future directions
Our study has some limitations. First, we used a shortened version of the right-wing
authoritarianism scale due to the length of the survey. This scale has also been criticized
by scholars because it measures RWA as a unidimensional concept and because of the
psychometric diﬃculties related to double-barrelled questions (see e.g., Duckitt et al.,
2010; Funke, 2005). Nonetheless, there is no reliable test for measuring multidimensional
right-wing authoritarianism in the Hungarian language, which is an important problem
Hungarian scholars should address in the near future. The scale of Enyedi (1996) is the
most commonly used scale for measuring RWA in Hungary, and was created from
Altemeyer’s instrument; therefore, we used it in our research. The shortened scale was
reliable, so we could successfully grasp the construct of RWA. On the other hand, we did
not have any hypothesis regarding the diﬀerential discriminant validity of the three
social attitude dimensions of RWA. As Altemeyer’s RWA scale correlated highly with the
reﬁned scale of Duckitt et al. (2010), which indicates that they measured the same
construct (Duckitt et al., 2010), we opted for using the old scale in our research.
Second, we selected only two groups to represent physically dangerous groups. We
thought that groups that often appear in Hungarian public discourse were mostly
symbolically threatening, but not physically harmful, and that is why we could list
more symbolically threatening groups. Third, we could have included more predictors
in our study, including social dominance orientation, relative deprivation, political
alienation, or low political power. Nonetheless, in spite of its role in explaining various
intergroup phenomena (Ho et al., 2015; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), high
social dominance orientation (SDO), is not so prevalent in Hungary, as SDO scores
usually tend to be lower than that of RWA (see e.g., Kende, Nyúl, Hadarics,
Wessenauer, & Hunyadi, 2018). A recent meta-analysis assessed research related to
antisemitism and antigypsyism between 2005 and 2017 in Hungary revealed that
right-wing authoritarianism is a more important predictor of anti-minority attitudes
than SDO (Kende et al., 2018). We did not include relative deprivation, political aliena-
tion, and low political power, as they are all antecedents of radical protest (see e.g.,
Daskin, 2016; Lemieux & Asal, 2010; Muller & Jukam, 1983; Staub, 1999, 2000). We only
measured the propensity for radical protest, as it is an expression of strong political
discontent and dissatisfaction (Muller & Jukam, 1983), but it would be useful in future
studies to also investigate its antecedents as separate predictors of intergroup violence.
Finally, as our results were correlational, we cannot establish whether right-wing author-
itarianism and propensity for radical protest were the causes of the justiﬁcation of
violence, or they co-occurred based on other factors. Experimental evidence in future
research should establish the causality in the established connection.
Despite these weaknesses, we found evidence that people high on right-wing
authoritarianism were more likely to feel that violence was justiﬁed against certain
groups, while people with higher propensity for radical protest justiﬁed violence in a
lower degree. We revealed that right-wing authoritarianism plays an important role in
the ideological justiﬁcation of violence against those groups that don’t harm directly,
but violate the accepted norms and values in a society, even if they are inﬂuential and
have high status. Although aggression is more acceptable against physically harmful
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groups, our ﬁndings help us to understand why aggression can be acceptable against
symbolically threatening groups, and also people’s motivations to harm them.
In summary, our ﬁndings can help decision-makers and non-governmental organiza-
tions to design more eﬃcient interventions to reduce violence. Also, they underline the
importance of the dominant political discourses in the justiﬁcation of violence. However,
they also showed that interventions should take into account the underlying motiva-
tions related to right-wing authoritarianism when tackling intergroup violence, and
identify methods based on the speciﬁc intergroup contexts.
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